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Where Are the Oil Jobs?
Domestic drilling activity topped 1,000 work-
ing rigs in October 2000 and then quickly sur-
passed the peak levels of the previous 1997–98 oil
cycle. Drilling in the United States has since increased
to 1,200 working rigs, a level of domestic activity
not seen since the mid-1980s; yet job growth in oil
and natural gas extraction remains surprisingly weak.
Drilling in the United States has surged to the high-
est levels of the past decade, but in December 2000
U.S. employment in oil and gas extraction was 10.9
percent below the previous peak. Texas was down
13.4 percent and Louisiana down 16.4 percent
(Figure 1). Lafayette, a major jumping-off point
for offshore activity in the Gulf of Mexico, was 
25.1 percent below its previous oil employment
peak, and Houston remained 8.6 percent under its
1998–99 peak. 
This article studies the data available and asks:
Where are the oil jobs? A rash of specific questions
can be asked about current oil extraction employ-
ment. Are productivity and technology displacing
jobs? Have tight labor markets prevented hiring by
oil companies, which came to the market late and
with a reputation for layoffs? Is the consolidation
of major oil companies into supermajors forcing
layoffs? Which oil cities does job growth favor, and
by how much? And, most important, what happens
to job growth going forward? Has job growth sim-
ply been delayed, or are we seeing another perma-
nent reduction in the number of oil field workers? 
Although productivity growth remains at work,
the data strongly suggest that reduced job growth
may be closely related to the string of mergers
among the major oil companies: Exxon/Mobil, BP/
Amoco/Atlantic Richfield, Chevron/Texaco, Total/
Petrofina/Elf Aquitaine, Repsol/YPF and Phillips/
Tosco. This conclusion leaves us without a firm
answer to whether much oil-related job growthyields only a few clues to the sluggish oil employ-
ment growth. It does, however, confirm that the
pattern of industry consolidation continues.
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Figure 2 shows the job growth since 1990
in four cities: Houston, Dallas, Lafayette, La.,
and Tulsa. (Note that Houston is measured on
the right scale of the chart, the other cities on the
left.) Houston and Lafayette illustrate the same
pattern of employment gains and losses as the
industry as a whole, with peaks and troughs
that mirror the rise and fall of both oil prices
and domestic drilling. Midland–Odessa, Bak-
ersfield, Calif., Fort Worth, Houma–Thibodaux,
La., New Orleans and Oklahoma City also make
the list of cities that still follow this pattern. In
contrast, Dallas and Tulsa show no recovery 
in this cycle, simply a pattern of continued
long-term decline. They are joined by Denver,
Wichita, Kan., Los Angeles and New York as well
as a number of smaller cities such as Amarillo,
Wichita Falls, Corpus Christi and Laredo. 
The complete lack of recovery in cities that
have historically provided a significant share of
the nation’s oil-related jobs partly explains the
pattern of current weak recovery in oil jobs,
but it does not tell why it is happening. Even
among nine cities that have a continued 
pattern of following the oil cycle, oil-related
employment is a collective 13.1 percent below
its 1997–98 peak. No one is spared from the
weak job recovery, although some cities are
hurt worse than others. 
PRODUCER CONSOLIDATION 
The key to weak job growth in oil extrac-
tion is most likely a combination of produc-
tivity gains and the mergers among major
lies ahead, either in Houston or elsewhere, but
the possibility of more oil jobs in 2001 remains
solid. 
PRODUCTIVITY 
Look at the trend line for U.S. jobs data in
Figure 1 or connect the peak values in 1991 and
1998—periods with 1,000 or more domestic
rigs at work—and it is clear that labor needs
are falling in oil and gas extraction. Output per
hour in oil extraction, as measured by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, indicates a strong 2.3
percent annual gain in output per worker dur-
ing 1987–98, when technology began to revo-
lutionize the industry. Three-dimensional seismic,
horizontal drilling, subsea completions and
other technological innovations have increased
drilling success rates while greatly expanding
the range of possible projects. A recent article
on oil and technology in The Atlantic Monthly
concludes: “The growing ingenuity of human
beings is outpacing the earth’s growing reluc-
tance to relinquish its treasure.”
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The failure to return to prior peak job lev-
els is partly because of continued productivity
gains. However, the pattern in Figure 1 seems
to have a unique cyclical element as well, a
sluggishness not accounted for by longer-term
trends. By just connecting the peak values in
the chart and extrapolating forward, it appears
we should be several percentage points ahead
of where we are today. 
WHICH CITIES ARE FAVORED? 
A look at oil-related job growth in a num-
ber of cities and their success in this oil cycle
Figure 1
Oil and Gas Extraction Employment, 1990–2000
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Figure 2
Four Oil Cities: Oil Extraction Jobs in the 1990s
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SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics.producers over the past two years. Figure 3
charts total U.S. oil employment (the same data
shown in Figure 1) as well as the job levels
attributed to producers versus oil service com-
panies. Oil producers are the decisionmakers
for oil exploration: they evaluate the prospects,
secure the financing, invest in exploration and
engage in the long-term production and mar-
keting of oil and natural gas. BP Amoco and
ExxonMobil Corp., for example, are among the
world’s largest producers, along with other
large companies and dozens of smaller inde-
pendents. In contrast, service companies bring
skills to the wellhead to drill, test and complete
a well for long-term production. 
Figure 3 shows a major split in the behav-
ior of producers versus service companies. The
service companies are needed at the wellhead
for every project; thus, their  employment has
increased at a solid pace since 1999, following
the number of working rigs upward. Employment
is still below the last peak, but rising. The fact
that service company employment is still trying
to reach the last peak may reflect productivity
gains, but it may also be caused by difficulty
hiring in a tight labor market, a lack of inter-
national work and a mix of domestic projects that
have not been complex or demanded as many oil
services as past expansions. The latter problems
are now disappearing: the labor market has
loosened up with the national economic slow-
down, and drilling has moved offshore, turned
to deeper prospects and employed more hori-
zontal and directional wells. As a result, more
service-related job growth could still lie ahead. 
The decline in producer employment is
part of a long-term trend. Employment in 2000
was only two-thirds of what it was in 1990. The
steady decline looks like the pattern seen in
Figure 2 for Dallas and Tulsa. These cities have
few service companies, and their local oil-
related job base has been greatly affected as
consolidation of major producers like Mobil
Corp. and Phillips Petroleum Co. has displaced
workers to other companies or locations. This
time, however, consolidation through mergers
has not just been geographic but widespread
enough to affect the industry as a whole. 
Oil service companies have consistently
reported that consolidation among the biggest
oil companies has been a drag on their business.
While the megamergers were being absorbed,
exploration activity was paralyzed among the
companies involved, especially slowing the
largest, riskiest and most resource-intensive pro-
jects that only major companies can undertake.
Exploration outside the United States is still 
10 percent below the last peak, for example,
and the majors—now supermajors—are prob-
ably responsible by being slow off the mark in
this expansion. 
To predict growth of producer employment
in 2001, we must first determine the cause of the
weak producer job growth. How much of the
recent decline stems from efficiencies and produc-
tivity gains due to mergers? And how much reflects
a late start in participating in the current explo-
ration boom? Small and medium-size independent
producers have acted aggressively, carrying
domestic exploration to its current high. The
majors are now ready to enter into more pro-
jects, more complex projects and more overseas
projects. The question remains: How many
more jobs will be needed as this work ex-
pands? Houston would be one obvious bene-
ficiary of any job gains.
—Robert W. Gilmer 
Albert Mitchell*
*Mitchell is a research associate with the 
Houston Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Dallas. 
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T he Houston economy is showing signs
of cooling, although local economic growth re-
mains solid. First-quarter job growth slowed to
an annual rate of 1.6 percent after growing at
an annual rate of 2.9 percent over the previous
three quarters, and the unemployment rate ticked
up to 3.5 percent. Auto sales are running behind
the strong record months of last year but other-
wise have never been better. New home sales
snapped back in March to post the best month
since the 1980s. The Houston Purchasing Man-
agers Index weakened slightly in March to just
over 60, in contrast to the U.S. manufacturing
index of 43.1. However, the Houston index still
points to very strong expansion, while the U.S.
index signals continued contraction. 
RETAIL AND AUTO SALES
Retailers report sales on track or slightly
ahead of plan, with inventories clearing out
nicely. The responses should be viewed in the
context of disappointing late fall and winter
sales; retailers probably revised downward
their expectations for the spring. 
The strong auto sales for February and
March were second only to last year’s record
numbers. Consumers seem to be revising spend-
ing plans down only a notch; luxury cars took
a big hit, while used car sales surged. 
CRUDE OIL AND OIL PRODUCTS 
Spring brings the weakest crude oil mar-
kets of the year, and OPEC cut oil production
in December by 1.5 million barrels per day in
anticipation of weaker seasonal demand. OPEC
announced another million-barrel cut in mid-
March in response to weaker worldwide eco-
nomic growth. Crude inventories grew steadily
this spring but remained below year-earlier
levels. Price briefly weakened to $26 per barrel,
the lowest of the year. 
Gasoline prices have become a major fac-
tor supporting crude prices in recent days, with
gasoline inventories running 4 to 5 percent below
last year’s extraordinarily low levels. Respond-
ing to good profit margins and public pressure
to supply heating oil, refiners have run plants
very hard for two years. Weak profits this spring
signaled a chance to do extended maintenance,
and the spring turnaround season was longer
and deeper than normal. The result has been
low inventories going into the summer driving
season and a sharp jump in wholesale and retail
gasoline prices. High prices—and good margins
for refiners—are expected to persist most of
the summer.
Heating oil and natural gas prices mostly
moved with late winter weather, but natural 
gas prices remained above $5 per thousand
cubic feet (Mcf). 
PETROCHEMICALS
If chemical producers had been asked 
to define their version of petrochemical hell
12 months ago, they would have said a softer
economy, a huge chunk of new capacity com-
ing on line and natural gas prices at $5 per
Mcf. The toughest times for petrochemicals in
20 years are now reality, with high feedstock
prices turning the Gulf Coast into the least
competitive region in the world and effec-
tively locking U.S. chemicals out of export
markets. Some chemical prices are rising to
cover production cost increases, but profits
are terrible.
DRILLING AND OIL SERVICES 
High crude and natural gas prices con-
tinue to translate into good news upstream.
Domestic drilling continues to improve slowly,
with equipment and labor constraints keeping
the rig count near 1,200, the highest level of
drilling activity since the mid-1980s. Interna-
tional drilling is also improving slowly, and rig
bidding activity is feeding rumors that a big
push by the majors may finally be under way.
FINANCIAL SERVICES 
As lenders and investors, bankers are
becoming more cautious. Higher credit stan-
dards are now in place. Banks have imple-
mented cost cutting and even hiring freezes,
although bank operations generally remain
healthy. Lower earnings are related more to
off-balance-sheet, fee-related activity than to
traditional bank lending.